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ABSTRACT 
This article advances the emergent literature on restraint within mili-
tant groups in three ways. First, it offers a framework for situating 
the “internal brakes on violent escalation”—understood as the practi-
ces through which group members shape the outer limits of their 
action repertoires—in relation to the interplay between conflict 
dynamics, intra-group processes and individual-level decision mak-
ing. Second, it develops a basic analytical strategy for examining 
how such brakes operate at different levels of proximity to potential 
or actual instances of escalation. Third, it sets out four types of 
mechanisms through which internal brakes appear to generate or 
enable restraint. 
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Few if any militant groups carry out as much violence as they are ostensibly capable of. 
Even among groups that routinely deploy violence in pursuit of their political or ideo-
logical goals, most place limits on their own violence, whether in terms of the degree or 
styles of violence they use, or the breadth of their targets.1 Understanding better how, 
why, where and when processes of restraint emerge, function, and sometimes fail offers 
numerous benefits. In addition to providing a more complete account of the observable 
patterns of political violence, it would also enable more precise assessments of the threat 
of violent escalation from specific groups or factions; support the identification of strat-
egies to prevent or limit further escalation of violence; and enhance understanding of 
how attempts by state actors to inhibit violence might complement or compromise 
existing intra-group “brakes” on violent escalation.2 
To date, however, processes of restraint within militant groups have often been con-
signed to the peripheral vision of political violence scholars. Within terrorism studies, 
this has largely been a product of an underlying methodological bias toward cases where 
violent escalation does occur, rather than those where it does not, or where it 
loses momentum before reaching classificatory thresholds for acts of terrorism.3 
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While terrorism scholars have taken considerable interest in how violence “ends” or de-
escalates,4 they have paid less attention to non-escalation or “truncated” processes of 
escalation.5 And where they have investigated processes of non- or limited escalation, 
the primary focus has been at the individual level of analysis.6 Meanwhile, although 
peace studies and social movement scholars have explored in detail the transitions 
between nonviolent and violent tactical repertoires,7 the dynamics of nonviolent resist-
ance8 and the upholding of nonviolent discipline,9 they have dedicated less attention to 
questions about how those who engage in violence establish and maintain limits on 
that violence.10 
This article comprises the second of two articles that report on a project in which we 
sought to respond to this limitation in the literature. Our intention in that project was 
to develop a descriptive typology of the practices through which members of militant 
groups themselves contribute to establish and maintain the parameters on their own 
violence, either in the form of resisting or preempting escalation or by exploring less 
violent alternatives—thereby inhibiting, albeit sometimes only marginally, the type of 
escalation processes often described within the terrorism literature.11 We referred to 
these practices as the “internal brakes on violent escalation,” and understood “militant 
groups,” for the purpose of this project, to refer to groups in which a significant pro-
portion of members have shown a willingness to deploy or support some use of vio-
lence. Our aim in developing this typology was to provide researchers and relevant 
policy and practitioner communities with a vocabulary that they could use to develop 
more systematic descriptions and analyses of the processes through which members of 
militant groups themselves contribute to shape the outer limits of their action 
repertoires. 
We developed the typology through a review of relevant literatures and the analysis 
of three militant milieus, selected using a “most-different case comparative strategy,”12 
with cases selected for their variation in terms of ideology and the scope and scale of 
violence. The cases we selected were the British jihadi milieu from 2001 to 2016, set 
within its international context; the British extreme right during the 1990s, and the ani-
mal liberation movement in the U.K. between the mid-1970s and the end of the 1990s. 
The jihadi case provided a case of an international milieu in which a particular form 
of theological reasoning has been used to advocate and justify mass casualty violence, 
albeit some actors within the movement have at times sought, often using the same 
body of theological reasoning, to manage the parameters of that violence. The case 
study examined how actors within the U.K. responded to efforts, spearheaded by the 
so-called Islamic State (IS), to expand and escalate jihadi violence. Here we focused on 
the evolution of the Al-Muhajiroun movement, which had always avoided direct associ-
ation with terrorism but ended up embracing IS after its declaration of a “caliphate,”13 
and an autonomous cell of individuals operating primarily on the social networking site 
Telegram, who pledged allegiance to IS and sought to carry out attacks in the U.K.14 
While Al-Muhajiroun publicly embraced IS, within the Telegram network some 
members began to question the validity and efficacy of IS tactics. These dynamics were 
studied in the wider context of debates concerning the limits of Islamist-inspired vio-
lence and responses to its escalation, particularly as articulated by leaders of 
Al-Qaeda.15 
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The extreme right case provided a case of mobilization around a racial-nationalist 
ideology where, although there was significant interpersonal violence, lethal violence 
was rare. The empirical focus was on the British National Party (BNP) during the 
1990s, and their innovation away from violence as they struggled to achieve electoral legit-
imacy while wrestling to contain the actions and influence of its radical flank, Combat 18 
(C18), a “stewards group” the  BNP  itself  had formed to  defend themselves  from a  “direct 
action” campaign by Anti-Fascist Action (AFA). Even within the radical flank, while fur-
ther escalation did take place, there were observable limits on violence, and actions that 
exceeded the parameters of what militants deemed acceptable violence provoked intra-
movement opposition, disillusionment and in some cases disengagement.16 
The animal liberation case focused on the radical flank of the animal rights move-
ment, understood as that part of the movement where activists were willing to use 
illegal tactics to advance campaigns for animal rights. The case study centered on the 
evolution of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and campaigns carried out under other 
organizational banners, such as the Animal Rights Militia and the Justice Department, 
which entailed escalation beyond established action repertoires. This case study provided 
a case of a single issue movement. It was also a movement in which, while activists did 
perpetrate acts of violence that caused physical and psychological harm to human and 
non-human animals, interpersonal violence was very rare, and lethal force was never 
deployed, even when state repression and control significantly inhibited the availability 
of non- or less violent strategies of action.17 
The cases were selected within a single country to provide geographic and therefore 
broad contextual consistency in case comparison, while retaining the most-different case 
comparative strategy. The choice of U.K.-based cases reflects the facts that the U.K. has 
experienced sustained and varied campaigns of non-state political violence, and that as 
a result of previous projects, the project team already had access to extensive documen-
tary evidence relating to two of the three case studies. As with any research based on a 
limited number of cases, there are obvious questions to be considered regarding wider 
applicability of the analysis. It is important that future research examines and compares 
restraint dynamics in non-U.K. contexts, and indeed that it examines restraint dynamics 
within other U.K. cases, the most obvious of which being the violence in Northern 
Ireland.18 Within this project, we sought to manage these limitations by engaging with 
the empirical literature around other cases in order to critically interrogate our emerg-
ing analysis. We also limited our research objectives accordingly. Specifically, we did 
not seek to assess the prevalence or effectiveness of the different brakes, or to provide a 
comprehensive explanation for the relative absence of greater violence. Rather, we 
sought simply first to identify practices that appeared to (be intended to) inhibit violent 
escalation, and then to develop a strategy of description that worked across the three 
main case studies and beyond. 
Each case study was based on analysis of primary and secondary documentary evi-
dence. This included the extant academic literature, movement publications, activist 
memoirs and court documents. For each case study we looked for and coded instances 
in which group members either (a) acted to reinforce existing parameters of what they 
deemed appropriate violence, (b) sought to counteract moves by other members of their 
group toward the adoption of more violent strategies of action, or (c) sought to innov-
ate toward less violent strategies of action. We understood escalation, and by extension 
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non-escalation and de-escalation, as terms relative to the existing repertoires of action 
within the milieus under analysis. Such a relative understanding of escalation was 
adopted to enable comparison across cases with very different outer limits of violence. 
Such an approach does however raise questions about whether there might be import-
ant qualitative differences in how thresholds between “appropriate” and “inappropriate” 
violence19 work when the starting point is very different. Such questions warrant further 
scholarly attention. 
In the project report and the first article,20 we argued that it was indeed possible to 
develop a typology of the “internal brakes” on violent escalation, and that the typology 
that we developed enabled us to describe the braking practices observed across the three 
main case studies and across other cases described in the academic literature. 
We organized this typology around five intersecting logics on which the intra-group 
brakes work: strategic logic; moral logic; ego-maintenance logic; the logic of out-group 
definition; and organizational logic. Brakes that work on strategic logic work on 
concerns that certain forms of violent escalation are likely to be ineffective or counter-
productive. Brakes that work on moral logic work on concerns that certain forms of vio-
lence directed at particular targets contradict their ethical principles. Brakes that work 
on the logic of ego-maintenance relate to questions about whether violent escalation is 
commensurate with established in-group identities—whether it is the “sort of thing that 
we do.” Such brakes often feed into but are not always obviously reducible to strategic 
or moral considerations. Brakes that work on the logic of out-group definition relate to 
processes of boundary softening—understood as the opposite of the boundary harden-
ing often associated with violent escalation21 —which, by turning members of out-groups 
into potential allies, supporters or, at least, not an existential threat, can also give rise to 
and reinforce brakes that work on moral and strategic logics. Brakes that work on 
organizational logic are brakes that work through processes of institutionalizing the lim-
its on violent escalation or creating intra-movement conditions more conducive to the 
application of restraint.22 
By organizing the typology in this way, we were able to identify and describe these 
intra-group brakes on violent escalation, and to offer some insight as to how they work 
and fail. Yet even as we wrote the conclusions to the previous publications, we were 
aware that this descriptive typology arguably generates as many, if not more, questions 
than it resolves. For example, are there particular constellations of brakes that are espe-
cially common, or effective, within groups characterized by particular organizational 
structures or that mobilize around particular ideologies? To what extent do patterns of 
braking and brake effectiveness vary across the conflict cycle? What happens to intra-
group brakes if and when those groups or movements split or fracture? Are some of the 
brakes more effective in relation to specific styles or degrees of violence? 
These are important questions, and providing satisfactory answers to them will 
require detailed, systematic empirical research. Yet as Paul Gill23 observes in relation to 
the wider field of research on terrorism and threat assessment, it will also require clear 
and effective conceptualization of these brakes and how they work and sometimes fail. 
It is this requirement for clear and effective conceptualization to which we attend in 
this article. We make three specific contributions. First, we provide a simple framework 
for situating these internal brakes both in relation to wider conflict dynamics and in 
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relation to intra-personal processes of decision-making and reflection. Second, we 
develop a basic analytical strategy for examining how such brakes operate at different 
levels of proximity to potential or actual instances of escalation. Third, we set out four 
types of mechanisms through which internal brakes appear to generate or enable 
restraint. In doing so, we argue, we lay a more stable foundation for researchers and 
analysts seeking to incorporate processes of restraint within their analysis and under-
standing of militant groups. 
Locating Intra-Group Processes of Restraint within Multi-Level Ecologies 
of Conflict 
While our particular interest within this project was the hitherto largely overlooked 
intra-group or “internal” brakes on violent escalation, these clearly do not emerge, 
evolve or function in a vacuum. Rather, intra-group processes of restraint are intimately 
related both to wider conflict dynamics, and to the lived experience, decision-making 
and reflection of individuals within those groups. 
The actions of security forces, societal elites, opposition groups, rivals and the general 
public are all likely to have a bearing on what group members conceive of as the 
parameters of appropriate violence, the types of brakes they apply, and the extent to 
which those brakes are effective. For example, if group members perceive that political 
opportunities are opening up, it is likely that some will advocate for the adoption of 
less violent strategies of action in order to exploit those opportunities.24 Conversely, 
when political opportunities close and/or where groups experience significant repres-
sion, although this might produce a decline in violence, or even the collapse of a cam-
paign, as the costs of “high risk activism” are raised beyond those that activists are able 
or willing to sustain,25 it is also likely that some members will respond to escalated 
repression with claims that greater violence is now appropriate, or the only available 
course of action, thereby undermining intra-group processes of restraint.26 
Such interplay between conflict-level and group-level dynamics can be seen in each of 
our three case studies. In the extreme right case, the BNP’s brief electoral success in 
1993, when they succeeded in electing a local councilor in east London, encouraged and 
empowered the party’s “modernising” faction, prompting the party leadership to priori-
tize electoral activity over street activity, the latter of which was phased out from 1994. 
The BNP leadership also sought to stem the appeal of its small but militant radical 
flank, C18, by proscribing the group, albeit this in effect led to C18 becoming more vio-
lent as the influence of the “modernisers” receded.27 
In the animal liberation case, a perception among activists during the early 1980s that 
there was widespread public support for and media interest in their cause prompted a 
major strategic innovation away from violence. This comprised the emergence of 
regional Animal Liberation Leagues that sought to deprioritise the use of clandestine 
raids on animal laboratories and storage facilities, in favor of mass daytime invasions, 
characterized by significantly reduced levels of property damage or theft.28 These actions 
resulted in mass arrests and heavy sentences, however, leading those involved to con-
clude that such tactics carried too high a cost, which resulted in this innovation being 
largely abandoned as the movement swung back toward more clandestine modes 
of action.29 
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The jihadi case meanwhile provides a useful illustration of how ostensibly similar 
developments within the broader conflict dynamic can have contrasting effects in terms 
of intra-group processes. In the U.K. there were long established brakes within Al-
Muhajiroun relating to practical concerns about the impact that illegal activity would 
have on the group’s freedom to operate and proselytize. These were swiftly undermined, 
however, when, after IS’s declaration of a caliphate, members decided that being seen to 
be consistent in their support for forces establishing a new caliphate outweighed such 
concerns. Yet elsewhere within the jihadi milieu the growing prominence of more vio-
lent groups, such as IS, had quite different effects. For example, it actually encouraged 
the Al-Qaeda leadership to emphasize the moral boundaries of legitimate violence in 
order to demarcate themselves from their new and increasingly influential rivals. These 
contrasting views regarding how to interpret and respond to IS’s escalation of violence 
created confusion among the grassroots activists within the Telegram group seeking to 
support the jihadi cause described above.30 
It is clear therefore that in order to undertake an effective analysis of intra-group 
processes of restraint, we must situate these within a broader conflict analysis.31 Yet 
intra-group processes of restraint also intersect with individual-level processes—with 
how individual group members think, emote, and reflect on their actions and those of 
their co-members. And while individual experience is likely to be influenced by their 
acculturation within the group, it is unlikely to be a mere mirror or extension of the 
group. Even in groups where members largely break-off external social ties, there will 
still be differences in group members’ lived experience reflecting, among other things, 
activists’ personal biographies32 and their different pathways into that activist milieu,33 
which are likely to translate into different attitudes and preferences regarding their 
strategies and tactics. 
Again, such intersections between group-level and individual-level processes can be 
seen in each of our case studies. In June 1989, one extreme right activist took part in a 
BNP-organized attack upon a community meeting at Welling Library, south London. 
The attack hospitalized seventeen people. The use of substantial interpersonal violence 
in itself wasn’t significantly outside of the normal, but the fact that the majority of those 
at the meeting were women represented an important breach of the movement’s moral 
norms, in which violence against women was usually associated with cowardice. It also 
represented a breach of this individual’s sense of self. His participation in the assault 
gave rise to shame and guilt: 
I began to realize that this was what race wars were about, the innocent attacked and their 
dignity destroyed. If my mother had known, she would have disowned me on the spot. 
[ … ] I was a fucking coward to have done such a thing.34 
In this case, these feelings did not dissipate—“Still Welling Library played on my 
mind … Did we really attack a meeting of women and gleefully report and celebrate 
it?.”35 Eventually, such feelings would propel him out of the movement and lead him to 
cooperate with the anti-fascists against his former colleagues. In the meantime however, 
this individual process of reflection and change also impacted on intra-group dynamics, 
at least within his immediate circle of contacts. The activist continued to be part of the 
extreme right, and indeed continued to engage in and sometimes enjoy the serious 
interpersonal violence that entailed, yet he gradually disengaged from such activities 
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and was reluctant to overstep his personal moral boundaries in this way again, thereby 
contributing to the reimposition of limits on what constituted appropriate violence—at 
least at an individual level.36 
In the animal liberation case, the letters pages of movement magazines provide a 
glimpse of how similar personal reflective processes contributed to the brakes on vio-
lence within this movement. Particularly in the wake of actions that went beyond estab-
lished action repertoires, such as the use of explosive devices in Bristol in 1989 and 
1990, many letter writers expressed shock, disappointment, frustration, condemnation 
and disgust, and in doing so helped to maintain or reestablish norms within the milieu 
regarding the parameters of what was or was not appropriate.37 
In the jihadi case, as IS moved toward greater, more gratuitous and less targeted 
violence, some members of the Telegram group expressed distinct unease about their 
willingness to declare other Muslims nonbelievers (a concept known as takfir), and 
about IS’s public execution of people considered to be innocent of any crime that 
would justify such violence. For example, some members of the group recoiled at the 
murder of Alan Henning, a British humanitarian aid worker who had set out to help 
those affected by the war in Syria. In doing so, they shaped the emergent normative 
order of that particular discursive space, infusing discussion of those particular devel-
opments with moral doubt, even as they still moved toward planning acts of 
terrorism.38 
As such, as well as situating intra-group processes within the context of broader con-
flict dynamics, it is also important to conceive of how they influence and are influenced 
by individual-level processes of decision-making and reflection. We propose a simple 
framework with which to do this (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. The intersections between intra-group brakes on violent escalation, conflict dynamics and 
individual level decision-making processes. 
8 J. BUSHER ET AL. 
Within this framework, developments at the more macro levels are conceived of as 
conditioning evaluations, opening and closing opportunities, structuring incentives and 
disincentives, or generating expectations at the more micro levels, but not determining 
what happens there. If new state powers are introduced restricting the opportunities for 
legal protest, it does not follow automatically that activists will reach for more violent 
strategies of action, but it is likely to translate into reduced opportunities for movement 
moderates to advocate for less violent strategies of action, and increased opportunities 
for radical flank actors to justify escalation as a strategy of last resort.39 
Similarly, intra-group management of the action repertoire does not determine how 
group members will act, but can raise or lower the costs of, or remove or create incen-
tives for, individuals to engage in escalated violence. If an individual anticipates that the 
use of escalated violence will result in sanction or moral disapproval from fellow, and 
especially high-status, group members, they will be more likely to choose to refrain 
from such violence40 and indeed to adopt and internalize such norms.41 
Yet processes at the more micro levels also shape practices, or at least intentions, at 
the more macro levels. Where, for example, an individual has resolved that they do not 
feel comfortable deploying violence against a particular category of persons, then they 
are likely to be reluctant to do so, and their nonparticipation in, or even questioning 
the appropriateness of, such violence in turn shapes emergent normative orders at the 
group level. Similarly, while the effectiveness of intra-group processes of restraint might 
be compromised by developments within the wider conflict dynamics, such as the 
ongoing escalation of repression42 or the emergence of out-bidding dynamics,43 intra-
group management of the action repertoire is likely to have significant implications for 
how activists respond to the actions of state actors or opposition groups. This might be, 
for example, by shaping their perceptions of what comprise appropriate or suitable 
responses to escalated state repression, or shaping the sorts of capabilities they have to 
respond to escalated violence by their opponents. 
In practice of course the boundaries between these levels are somewhat fuzzy. 
Returning to the case of the extreme right activist mentioned above, his visceral reaction 
to the attack in which he participated is partly the outcome of a process of individual 
moral reflection. It is, however, also shaped by wider group and societal norms about 
the illegitimacy of violence against women. Similarly, clear distinctions between what 
comprises intra-group management of the action repertoire and what comprises part of 
the wider conflict dynamics are likely to be disrupted as in-group and out-group boun-
daries shift: as allies become rivals or opponents, and so forth. Yet this framework is 
intended to be orientative rather than definitive: a way of beginning to think through 
and interrogate how and where processes of restraint emerge, operate and evolve. 
We argue that this model, while simple, is useful in two ways in particular. First, it is 
intentionally agnostic about the origins of processes of restraint: it makes no a priori 
claims about what comprises the “primary ‘location’ of causality.”44 This helps to clarify 
that when we discuss “internal brakes” or “intra-group brakes” this does not imply a 
claim about the causal roots of these phenomena. Brakes are “internal” or “intra-group” 
only insofar as they comprise practices through which group members seek to shape 
the actions of other group members, but it is assumed that the causal roots of these 
practices are complex and diffuse. 
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Second, by keeping present the interactions between the conflict-, group- and individ-
ual-levels, this basic framework helps to avoid generating an account of restraint that 
either unduly privileges “internalist” perspectives,45 or is overly deterministic or top-
down and leaves insufficient space for individual agency.46 While certain configurations 
of external conditions might make the application of brakes appear “logical” to outside 
observers, they do not determine that those brakes will be applied: rather, group mem-
bers must apprehend and internalize those logics.47 Likewise, the fact that some group 
members, even influential ones, might try to encourage restraint, does not guarantee 
that activists across the movement will conform to those requests, or that external 
actors will perceive and appreciate the restraint being exercised by the group and 
respond accordingly.48 
How Brakes Operate at Different Levels of Proximity to “The Action” 
In each of our three cases studies, we found examples of internal brakes being applied 
across a range of different settings. Within the jihadi case, this included high-level 
internal strategic debates within Al-Qaeda’s international leadership, within public com-
munications, in internal discussions among Al-Muhajiroun activists, and in private con-
versations as members of the Telegram network exchanged and discussed information 
about national and international campaigns and planned their own activities. Within 
the extreme right case, we found brakes operating in the BNP’s strategic planning, their 
official publications, and internal communications, during and immediately after phys-
ical confrontations between extreme right militants and their various opponents, during 
informal one-to-one or small group conversations among activists, and within the con-
text of activists’ private reflections. And within the animal liberation case, we found 
examples of brakes being applied in public communiques, during debates that filled the 
pages of movement magazines, instruction manuals, in the deliberations and declara-
tions of movement leaders, as well as in the course of actions such as arson attacks, 
laboratory break-ins and hunt saboteuring. 
In order to generate a “thicker”49 description of these brakes, and how processes of 
restraint emerge, diffuse and operate or, conversely, where, when and how they fail to 
diffuse or become embedded, we wanted to find a way of describing and categorizing 
these different contexts. To do this, we developed a conceptual model comprising four 
different types of contexts, characterized by their relative temporal and physical distance 
to instances of escalation beyond the parameters of broadly established action reper-
toires (Figure 2). 
This model is loosely inspired by two related bodies of literature. The first is the lit-
erature that develops and deploys the “flashpoints” model to understand and explain 
instances of public disorder, and draws attention to how such violence emerges across 
multiple levels of “structuration”: structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual, 
situational and interactional.50 The second is the literature that examines the role of 
micro-situational interactions in shaping the dynamics of political violence.51 From the 
flashpoints model, we drew the basic idea that the emergence of violence—or in our 
case restraint—can be understood as a multi-layered process that both conditions and is 
constituted by human action. From the research on the role of micro-situational 
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Figure 2. Different levels of proximity to “the action.” 
interactions in shaping the dynamics of political violence, we drew the basic ideas that 
micro-situational interactions can develop their own logics that are sometimes distinct 
from those of the wider conflict of which they are or will become a part, and that 
micro-situational encounters can, through a series of feedback mechanisms, alter the 
subsequent dynamics of the wider conflict. 
Within our model, the first and broadest type of contexts we refer to as the move-
ment building contexts. These are all of the settings in which group members are 
engaged in activities that might be crucial to the development of their movement or 
struggle, but do not comprise undertaking or actively planning a specific action or cam-
paign. This would include activities—speeches, meetings, publications etc.—in which 
group members are involved in developing and setting out their general political or 
ideological positions, strategic positioning, developing general claims about whose inter-
ests they represent, articulating their goals, fostering solidarity and enmities, recruitment 
campaigns, and undertaking general management tasks related to movement organiza-
tion, discipline, membership and finance. Within these settings, there is likely to be a 
great deal of discussion and deliberation pertinent to establishing and maintaining the 
outer limits of their action repertoire, but this will tend to be about the development of 
principles and norms that are generalizable across multiple actions, and will largely be 
infused with the logics inscribed within fairly high-level strategic planning, the elabor-
ation of movement philosophies and identities, and jockeying for position among move-
ment factions and their leaders. Much of the discussion among British jihadi 
sympathizers on Telegram, for instance, revolved around the notion of legitimate target-
ing and, in particular, excommunication: when it applied, to whom and the broader 
implications of declaring other believers, including close family, nonbelievers, with 
members variously inspired by pro-IS or Al-Qaeda sources, or torn by which position 
to adopt.52 
The second type of contexts we refer to as action planning contexts. These are the set-
tings in which group members attend to the specifics of developing and undertaking a 
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particular action or campaign: identifying targets, considering logistical arrangements in 
progressively greater detail, allocating roles to different group members, seeking permis-
sions or the blessings of relevant movement authorities, deciding whether or not to 
inform or engage with public authorities about their plans, discussing thresholds for the 
abandonment of the action, ruling out certain courses of action, and so forth. Here, 
broader principles about what comprises appropriate modes of action intersect with 
practical considerations and the looming reality of the planned action. Taking again the 
example of the Telegram group of jihadi sympathizers, as some of them moved closer 
to planning a terrorist attack in London, the more abstract debates about what comprise 
proportionate and legitimate targets, which had focused attention on members of the 
police or armed forces, rather than the general public, evolved into more focused dis-
cussion about specific targeting decisions and hostile reconnaissance.53 
The third type of settings are the situational contexts in which group members are 
directly engaged in the action, carrying out their plans, and reacting and adjusting to 
the situation on-the-ground—as Mike Tyson observed, “everybody has a plan until they 
are punched in the face.” Here, broader principles and established action plans and 
preparations intersect with the micro-situational logics of the interactions and confron-
tations that emerge within the actions themselves. This might result in their move 
toward violence being checked by “situational tension and fear”54 or accelerated through 
“forward panic” dynamics,55 or the weakening or strengthening of “moral disen-
gagement”56 as individuals are confronted with the immediate reality of their actions. 
While not part of our case studies, some of the most striking examples of restraint 
emerging at the situational level can be found in the testimonies of individuals who had 
planned to undertake mass casualty attacks but found that they were unable or unwill-
ing to go through with it. Kerry Noble, for example, was a leading figure in the 
Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord group who, in 1984, was on the cusp of bomb-
ing the Metropolitan Community Church in Kansas City because, as he notes in his 
memoir, it was a “gay church.” He “hesitated” long enough to take stock of his sur-
roundings, which caused him to re-humanise his potential victims. Having come to see 
them as no different from himself in that split second, he abandoned his plans.57 
Similar examples can be found amongst failed Palestinian suicide bombers, some of 
whom expressed regret about their involvement after being arrested or talked of their 
desire to abandon their missions after they were launched.58 
The fourth set of contexts are what we refer to as immediate post-escalation contexts. 
As the names suggest, these are the contexts in the immediate aftermath of instances of 
escalation above and beyond “normal” violence—where the brakes in effect have 
failed—and where group members are reacting to that escalation. In each of our case 
studies we found a particular proliferation of what look like brakes within these con-
texts. In the extreme right case we have already described how the sense of shame and 
disgust experienced by one activist emerged after the attack on the group at Welling 
Library, and how that effected his and, less directly, his fellow activists subsequent 
behavior. Similarly, despite his reputation for violence, after participating in an attack 
on “left-wing paper sellers on Brick Lane,” one National Front activist involved with 
C18 activities, reportedly “threw up down a side alley.” He later told a fellow activist 
that the level of violence used against a target who were unable to defend themselves 
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(i.e. left-wing paper sellers rather than anti-fascist militants) “went too far.”59 And while 
both of these examples arguably speak largely to processes of individual reflection, 
within this case study we also find more obviously intra-group processes of criticizing 
and pulling back from further violence, such as in the immediate aftermath of David 
Copeland’s nail bombing campaign in London in 1999.60 
In the jihadi case study, as noted above, we see how members of the Telegram net-
work recoiled at the killing of a humanitarian aid worker. Internal memos from the Al-
Qaeda leadership, seized during the May 2011 raid that killed Usama bin Ladin, also 
reveal how attacks on places of worship and commercial centers by local affiliates and 
allies, such as the Pakistani Taliban, prompted mounting concern among senior leaders 
not only about undermining public support, but also about the legality and proportion-
ality of the attacks, resulting in public communiques intended to rein in these allies.61 
And in the animal liberation case, we can observe in movement magazines the swift 
and widespread condemnation of the use of explosive devices after incidents that clearly 
exceeded established repertoires of action. 
There are a number of possible explanations as to why we see so much braking tak-
ing place after instances of violent escalation. There are likely to be particular legal and 
reputational incentives at these times for individuals and groups potentially associated 
with such escalated violence to criticize or distance themselves from it: which raises 
challenging questions about how one deciphers more or less sincere criticisms of esca-
lated violence within post-escalation contexts. It is also however likely to be a function 
of the personal and intra-movement turbulence that escalation beyond established rep-
ertoires of action can generate as group members, both individually and collectively, 
seek variously to understand, justify or distance themselves from the actions that have 
taken place.62 
What is most important for our purposes is that these reactions can have an impact 
on the subsequent trajectory of violence—a fact that is not surprising if one adopts a 
processual understanding of conflict “in which antecedent events condition, shape, or 
‘cause’ subsequent events.”63 In the extreme right case, there was no repeat of David 
Copland’s killings; in the animal liberation case, there was no repeat of the use of the 
type of explosive devices used in 1989 and 1990, even as activists at the radical flank of 
the movement continued to use incendiary devices; and in the jihadi case the activists 
in the Telegram network focused their attention on targeting members of the police 
and armed forces after the killing of Alan Henning had met with condemnation. In 
other words, far from being simply a case of closing the stable door after the horse 
has bolted, the post-hoc application of brakes in the immediate post-escalation 
contexts might actually be key moments in shaping the trajectory of future escalation, 
de-escalation or non-escalation. 
The application of brakes within any of these types of contexts can affect the likeli-
hood of further brakes being applied subsequently in other contexts. Perhaps most obvi-
ously, brakes applied within movement building contexts can in effect cascade down 
into action planning and situational contexts, and into immediate post-escalation con-
texts. Indeed, within our three case studies the brakes applied within action planning 
and situational contexts often worked on brakes already developed within movement 
building contexts, such as when group members invoked the established strategic or 
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moral logics of their wider campaigns when seeking to maintain discipline during event 
preparation or execution. Yet as the example of Kerry Noble illustrates, restraint is not 
always or necessarily rooted in broader processes of movement development, but rather 
can seemingly emerge spontaneously within action planning or situational contexts out 
of the emergent logics of those particular settings, or through individual responses to 
the evolving situation. Furthermore, and as noted above, instances of escalation and 
non-escalation are themselves likely to generate feedback loops that alter how group 
members prepare for subsequent actions and influence wider movement debates about 
their aims, objectives, purpose and modus operandi.64 
The way in which brakes might emerge at different levels of proximity to potential acts 
of escalation, and how these in turn can shape subsequent processes of restraint, can be 
seen in the animal liberation case. Here, movement building contexts are positively satu-
rated with the deployment of brakes that work on moral, ego-maintenance and out-group 
definition logics, in the form of repeated insistences on their commitments to nonviolence 
and the reduction of suffering for non-human and human animals. There is also the fre-
quent application of strategic brakes in the form of discussions about the need for a 
broad-based under- and over-ground movement in order to achieve their goals.65 While 
some radical flank activists loosened these brakes—by, for example, arguing that their 
campaigns of intimidation did not constitute violence, or that their violence was an action 
of last resort66 —the brakes developed and applied within the movement building contexts 
nonetheless informed how activists across the movement planned and carried out their 
actions. For example, during their planning, even at the most radical fringes of the move-
ment activists accessed and shared information about how to effectively minimize the risk 
of inadvertent harm to animals, both non-human and human, during arson attacks and 
other actions; and when the Animal Liberation Leagues sought to innovate away from 
clandestine raids to mass daytime invasions, some activists engaged in training exercises 
to help maintain nonviolent discipline during these actions.67 Similarly, activists 
often reminded one another during actions not only of the personal consequences of ill-
discipline, but also how it might undermine their cause and advance that of the animal 
abusers and/or the state security forces.68 Yet within the same case study there are also 
examples of restraint emerging out of micro-situational contexts. It seems, for example, 
that at some hunts, hunt saboteurs and supporters achieved a form of negotiated equilib-
rium in which both pursued their goals while largely avoiding physical confrontation or 
maintaining any confrontation at a low level. Indeed, there are anecdotes about hunts at 
which it was not unheard of for participants and saboteurs to drink peaceably in the 
same pubs after the hunt,69 and even of hunt saboteurs receiving a ride home from hunt 
participants with whom they had become acquainted.70 The fact that saboteurs perceived 
there to be less risk of serious physical assault at those hunts meant they were less likely 
to perceive it necessary to “sab” those hunts en masse in order to protect themselves, or 
to do so in revenge for previous skirmishes,71 which in turn reduced the probability of 
escalated confrontations, thereby generating virtuous cycles that likely go some way to 
explaining the marked difference in violence across different hunts, even within a few 
dozen miles  of  one another.  
As before, putting this basic model into practice poses some challenges. One of these 
again relates to the fuzzy lines between these categories. Even as activists make plans 
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for a specific action, they are likely still to be engaged in processes of constructing the 
wider frames through which they interpret and organize their struggle. And it can be 
difficult to identify the point at which action planning actually becomes being “in the 
action”: is it on the morning of the planned action, when they arrive at the place where 
they planned to undertake the action, or only when they are in the act of tipping over a 
rival group’s newspaper stand, opening the roof of the animal laboratory or arming the 
bomb at the checkpoint? Indeed, for more detailed analyses of specific cases, further 
layering might be advantageous, e.g. distinguishing between contexts in which activists 
are planning specific actions and the slightly higher level planning of campaigns of 
actions, such as a series of bombings, a series of provocative or intimidatory marches; 
or a series of raids on animal laboratories. 
Another challenge relates to data access. While in most cases researchers or analysts 
are likely to be able to access a fairly substantial amount of data relevant to the move-
ment building and immediate post-escalation contexts, action planning often takes place 
in less accessible settings, particularly where the planned actions are illegal or are more 
likely to be effective if they exploit the element of surprise. It can therefore be difficult 
to locate data relevant to such practices, even retrospectively. Analysis of the situational 
contexts can pose a similar problem. 
These are not insurmountable problems, however, and in practice researchers and 
analysts will usually find themselves working with imperfect datasets. What this way of 
approaching the brakes on violent escalation does is help to capture and give analytical 
prominence to the dynamic nature of restraint, and to the way that, like violence itself, 
restraint also “develops in action.”72 This is likely to be important if we are to generate 
effective explanations for how and why, and the conditions under which, certain brakes 
work and fail. 
It also holds out the possibility of being able to sharpen our ability to assess emergent 
risks of violent escalation. If we can see clear evidence of brakes being applied within 
movement building contexts, those seeking to apply brakes closer to the action will 
have more to work on, and it is likely that, if escalation does happen, the costs in terms 
of movement cohesion will be higher as it will clearly undermine those who sought to 
apply the brakes. Similarly, the presence or absence of brakes being applied in the 
immediate post-escalation contexts is likely to provide valuable clues about whether the 
escalated violence that has taken place either becomes the “new normal,” or remains an 
outlier in the movement’s history. 
The Mechanisms through Which Intra-Group Brakes Generate or 
Enable Restraint 
The third contribution we make in this article is to set out four types of mechanisms 
through which intra-group brakes generate or enable restraint. In doing so we add a 
further layer to our understanding of how these brakes work and fail. While the 
descriptive typology we presented previously identifies the logics on which these brakes 
operate, it tells us little about the mechanisms through which these brakes, once applied, 
serve to generate restraint among militants within the group in question. 
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Based on analysis of our three main case studies and on the wider literature on the 
dynamics of escalation, de-escalation and non-escalation we identify four types of mech-
anism through which intra-group brakes work. The first are disciplinary mechanisms 
that work through the making and issuing of rules and guidance about what group 
members should or should not do, and the enforcement of those rules through sanc-
tions and rewards. Examples of rule-setting were among the most abundant and easiest 
to find brakes in each of the case studies, observable within multiple public statements, 
internal communiques and guideline documents. In the jihadi case we see this sort of 
rule-setting in the issuing of specific “rules” and “guidance” by Al-Qaeda’s leaders artic-
ulating the boundaries within which fighters were permitted to operate, including the 
rules of engagement and targeting.73 These included Ayman al-Zawahiri’s General 
Guidelines for the Jihadi, published in 2013, that included clear limitations in terms of 
legitimate targets, and were later ridiculed by the IS group for their alleged leniency and 
deviance from religious law.74 
In the extreme right case, the BNP issued an Activists Handbook which laid down a 
series of guidelines for personal conduct, and other groups also published their own 
codes of conduct, though these were often honored in the breach rather than the obser-
vance. In the animal liberation case, the ALF Credo, which states that anybody can call 
themselves an ALF activist provided that they abide by a series of basic rules, is perhaps 
the most obvious example of such rule-setting. 
What were less apparent in our three case studies were examples of the enforcement 
of those rules. There are a number of factors that might explain this. In part it might 
reflect the group structures and power dynamics of the groups under analysis. In the 
jihadi and animal liberation cases we were looking at fairly acephalous groups with lim-
ited or very limited formal command and control structures. In the extreme right case, 
the highly fragmented and politically marginal nature of the movement, and the appar-
ent draw of the radical flank to much of the rank-and-file membership, meant that the 
authority of BNP leaders was precarious; efforts to impose discipline upon rank-and-file 
members for transgressing party diktats risked alienating activists, the lifeblood of the 
party, who could very well de-camp to rival groups if they deemed the sanctions unduly 
harsh.75 The relative absence of data pertaining to rule-enforcement might also reflect a 
methodological challenge: the distribution of sanctions and rewards is likely often to 
take place behind closed doors, therefore making it more difficult to identify suitable 
data, and is also likely often to combine more formal disciplinary procedures with more 
subtle forms, such as informal praise or scorn, prestige or disgrace.76 As a result such 
processes can be rather diffuse and difficult to pin-down to specific incidents. 
Nonetheless, some examples of (attempts at) control through sanction and reward 
can be identified. In the jihadi case, leaders admonished—privately and publicly, expli-
citly and implicitly—subordinates and affiliates, stretching from attempts to control Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi’s autonomous affiliate in Iraq in 2005 to efforts to limit the violence 
of Pakistani affiliates and, later, by jihadis fighting on different sides after civil war 
broke out in Syria.77 In the animal liberation case, enforcement of the movement’s rules 
often came as much from the grassroots of the movement as it did from movement 
organizers, such as, for example, in the criticisms and rebukes that appeared within the 
letters pages of movement magazines described above. In the extreme right, the BNP 
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leadership eventually proscribed C18, although, as described above, this inadvertently 
undermined the ability of movement moderates to exert any control or influence within 
the milieu’s radical flank, and therefore arguably constitutes an example of a braking 
attempt that backfired, or at least displaced violence to another part of 
the “movement.”78 
One noteworthy characteristic of these disciplinary mechanisms is how often they 
appear to work through establishing structures of conditionality around the use of vio-
lence. That is, they restrict violence by setting out the conditions under which greater 
violence would be or is legitimate, but then argue that such conditions have not yet 
been met.79 So, for example, violence might be constructed as appropriate if and only if 
it is undertaken in self-defense or as a last resort,80 or if it only affects a specific 
“legitimate” target.81 These structures of conditionality then enable criticism, and in 
some cases other forms of disciplinary action, if these conditions are not met: as hap-
pened when key figures within the extreme right voiced their disapproval of David 
Copelands’ nail bombings as “misdirected mayhem,” or on the grounds that the time 
simply was not right for armed struggle.82 
The use of such structures of conditionality has a number of potential benefits for 
movement organizers. By not categorically ruling out more violent courses of action, it 
potentially facilitates within-group compromise and cohesion whilst also effectively for-
ward-proofing one’s legitimacy as a leader, and leaving escalation on the table can serve 
as an effective device with which to threaten, intimidate and bargain with opponents.83 
It also creates opportunities for escalation, however, if the situation changes and radical 
flank actors can argue that the conditions for violence have been met, as happened in 
the case of Al-Muhajiroun’s embrace of greater violence after the declaration of a 
caliphate by IS. 
The second type of mechanism through which intra-group brakes work is by shaping 
group members’ perceptions of the nature of their struggle in ways that constrain 
opportunities for violent escalation. This might be about shaping how group members 
conceive of themselves (e.g. in the case of ego-maintenance brakes), or their opponents 
(e.g. in the case of brakes based on out-group definition); about how they perceive what 
is possible and what is most likely to be effective (e.g. in the case of strategic brakes) or 
what is or is not at stake (e.g. in the case of moral brakes). 
In the animal liberation case for example, this type of mechanism can be found oper-
ating in the efforts by movement moderates to inhibit the move toward more radical 
strategies of action by persuading fellow activists that there was broad public support 
for their cause, and by attempting to construct a movement theory that emphasized the 
need for a mass movement: something that often ran contrary to radical flank activists’ 
self-image as members of a revolutionary underground. In the extreme right case, 
this type of mechanism can be found in BNP organizers’ efforts to persuade the rank-
and-file to re-imagine themselves not as a street movement locked in violent struggle 
with anti-fascists, but as a viable, if revolutionary, political party able to gain support 
with a substantial minority of the general population and achieve change through elect-
oral means. 
Whether or not such mechanisms work is likely to depend to a large degree on the 
ability of those articulating these visions of their struggle to persuade other members of 
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the group. This in turn is likely to be a function both of the credibility and influence of 
that individual within the group and, as discussed above, of wider conflict dynamics84: 
e.g. the BNP organizers’ ability to persuade members and supporters that they were a 
viable political party was given a major boost by their initial electoral success in 1993. 
A third type of mechanism through which these brakes work is by shaping group or 
individual capabilities to undertake violent escalation. This mechanism is most appar-
ent in what we have previously described as “organisational brakes,” where group mem-
bers either invest in, or divest from, capabilities that would enable the group to carry 
out acts of (greater) violence. 
In the extreme right case for example, as the BNP pivoted toward electoral campaign-
ing, they began to lose the support of some of their previously more able and violent 
street fighters, and began to attract support from people with less ability or inclination 
for participating in physical confrontations with anti-fascist activists, making the pro-
spect of returning to such modus operandi an unappetizing prospect. In the animal lib-
eration case, even as opportunities for disruptive yet legal protest became increasingly 
limited, activists did not move to stock-pile weapons or high explosives, thereby reduc-
ing further the probability that they would seek to use lethal force. 
This mechanism speaks to elements of path dependency whereby strategic or tactical 
decisions made at one point in time shape the options that group members have in sub-
sequent moments.85 Applying restraint, particularly at an early stage of an organization’s 
life cycle, can serve to inhibit the acquisition of capabilities for violent escalation86 or 
can foster the augmentation of capabilities for less-violent strategies of action, which in 
turn make the use of more violent strategies of action less appealing as the comparative 
benefits of deploying violence are diminished. 
These first three mechanisms broadly align with the concepts of intent and capability 
often found in the literature on risk assessment.87 The first two mechanisms relate to 
militants’ intent to undertake greater violence; the third relates directly to capability. 
The fourth mechanism that we propose offers what we believe is an important augmen-
tation to thinking about how these brakes might work: this is by constructing 
opportunities to favor restraint without losing face. 
While popular and policy discourse about radical milieus often imagines them com-
prising individuals with a heightened, sometimes almost all-consuming, appetite for vio-
lence, such a view is not well-supported by the empirical evidence. While some 
undoubtedly are attracted to such milieus by the prospect of violence, Simi and 
Windisch,88 in their research on why people within white supremacist sub-cultures in 
the United States do not do as much violence as they might, observe for example that 
“[c]ontrary to the common perception that extremists are ‘crazy’ individuals determined 
to kill as many innocent bystanders as possible, our data suggest extremists struggle 
with the idea of taking another person’s life.” As such, while it might be reasonable to 
expect members of militant groups to be more accustomed to and prepared for violence 
than the average member of the general public, most will still experience the “situational 
tension and fear” that arises as acts of violence loom into view,89 whether that is a 
result of the corrosion of their moral disengagement,90 having doubts about the moral 
logic that would enable them to construct that violence as appropriate or necessary,91 or 
a more visceral upsurge of fear or apprehension. However, significant social pressures 
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can make it difficult for individuals to draw back from violence. Indeed, in some groups 
ongoing participation in violence is a prerequisite for acceptance.92 
We propose that another way that the intra-group brakes on violent escalation can 
work is by countering pressures to engage in or advocate for greater violence, creating 
instead opportunities for group members to encourage or exercise restraint without com-
promising their position with the group or jeopardizing other “critical relationships.”93 
For example, when group members have a narrative available to them about the import-
ance of maintaining group discipline in order to achieve their strategic objectives, or 
about the moral value of restraint and mercy, it becomes easier for them to draw back 
from violence, regardless of what their actual motives are for doing so. 94 Similarly, 
Ellefsen and Busher95 describe how, during the latter stages of the Stop Huntingdon 
Animal Cruelty campaign, at a time when state repression had generated widespread fear 
within the activist community, an emergent discourse about the importance of building 
public support provided a face- and morale-saving way for some animal liberationists to 
endorse and encourage a “strategic” shift toward less militant modes of activism. 
We note that it can be difficult to find evidence of this mechanism at work within 
movement publications or indeed in activist memoirs, not least because, due to reasons of 
personal pride and possible reputational costs, most activists are likely to be reluctant to 
discuss or acknowledge such processes. We can catch enough glimpses of this mechanism 
however to believe that it is worth our attention, or at least warrants further investigation 
through, for example, detailed interview-based or ethnographic research. This is also a 
mechanism described in other contexts of violent escalation and non-escalation. In pro-
grams to reduce gang violence in U.S. cities, for example, creating viable “outs” or “off-
ramps” for those who might otherwise be drawn into violence—enabling individuals to 
identify and choose alternatives to violence while maintaining reputation and honor—has 
been identified as a particularly effective intervention strategy.96 
Taking into consideration this fourth mechanism would suggest that whether escal-
ation does or does not occur is not just about whether or not group members have an 
appetite for and capability to undertake greater violence, but also about the extent to 
which, if and when they begin to feel uncomfortable with the violence in which they 
are (about to be) engaged, they have available pathways away from violence that do not 
imply serious loss of face. If this is the case, it suggests that serious consideration should 
be given both to understanding how group members create and maintain viable path-
ways away from violence, and to how external interventions might strengthen or erode 
these pathways. 
Conclusions 
Developing a stronger understanding of how militant groups and their members 
develop and deploy restraint, and how these “internal brakes” work and fail, responds 
to an important limitation in our knowledge regarding the dynamics of political vio-
lence, and potentially offers important benefits to scholars, policymakers and practi-
tioners alike. The identification and analysis of instances of “push back” against moves 
toward greater violence from within the group or movement, or of innovation away 
from violence, can provide particularly valuable diagnostic moments with which to 
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better understand the extent and nature of the threat that groups pose, the current state 
of intra-group relationships, and the extent and nature of opportunities to engage with 
or intervene in such groups in ways that bolster restraint and, ultimately, lead away 
from violence. 
Yet brakes sometimes fail. Even when the leaders of a group encourage restraint, this 
is no guarantee that rank-and-file members across the movement will conform to those 
requests, or that efforts to limit escalation will embed across a group or movement at 
the same pace. If we are to take advantage of the analytical benefits of being attentive to 
processes of restraint, we must develop a robust conceptualization of how these brakes 
work and fail. 
This article has made three contributions to that end. First, it has offered a frame-
work for situating the “internal brakes on violent escalation” in relation to the interplay 
between conflict dynamics, intra-group processes and individual-level decision making. 
Second, it has developed a basic analytical strategy for examining how these brakes 
operate at different levels of proximity to potential or actual instances of escalation. 
Third, it has described four types of mechanisms through which internal brakes appear 
to generate or enable restraint. 
Our intention is not to argue that all attempts to examine intra-group brakes need 
necessarily deploy all three of these frameworks. We would argue however that holding 
them in mind and using them to structure and inform data collection, collation and 
analysis, can help move us collectively toward a more detailed, systematic and theorized 
understanding of processes of restraint within militant groups. In this respect, it is 
hoped that this article provides a much needed contribution toward establishing the 
kind of conceptual foundations that are required if this avenue of research into the 
internal restraints on violence within militant groups is to prove fruitful over the com-
ing years. 
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